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The 1990s witnessed an explosion in cross-border merger and acquisitions (M&A) activ-
ity, as can be seen in Figure 1. Increases in these capital °ows partly re°ected a shift in
the composition of foreign direct investment (FDI) away from \green¯eld" investment (i.e.,
¯rms started from scratch). These increases were also spurred by the growth in global ¯nan-
cial markets that allowed ¯rms to take advantage of investment opportunities at home and
abroad.
This increase in M&A activity raises a host of issues. For example, high activity within
Europe and European investment in the U.S. has led economists to ask questions such as:
Did the growth and merging of ¯nancial markets in Europe, spawned by the arrival of the
Euro in 1999, lead to the increase in cross-Atlantic investment by European companies?
Did the increase in acquisitions of U.S. companies by European ¯rms play a role in the
depreciation of the Euro?
At a more general level, these cross-border M&A °ows have also allowed ¯rms to diver-
sify their production abroad and have led to increased economic integration across countries.
Given the importance of these M&A °ows and that economists have traditionally concen-
trated on studying \green¯eld" investment, it is only natural to inquire into the determinants
underlying the size and direction of these °ows.
This study applies the gravity model framework to these questions. This simple empirical
framework has been commonly used in the trade literature and more recently in the asset
trade literature. Generally, gross bilateral capital °ow data are rare, but I am able to ¯ll
this void through the use of a new comprehensive data set of world M&A °ows covering the
period 1990-1999. According to the data set used in this study the value of deals announced
have increased by almost 7 fold over the decade, while the deals which have gone into e®ect
during this period have increased by 10 fold. One can see in Tables 1 and 2 that the growth in
announced M&A deals has not been restricted to just OECD country-pairs, but also between
1non-OECD countries, and between OECD and non-OECD countries1. Furthermore, the
number of deals announced has only trebled thereby indicating that the value of the average
deal has also increased substantially.
Given this increase in activity, why should we care about these deals? First, these forms
of capital °ows may be considered as safer forms of foreign investment for the target country
| compared to equity or debt °ows, for example | because the country does not have to
worry about a sudden reversal of in°ows, as witnessed in the crises during the late 1990s.
Second, these °ows o®er di®erent types of economic gains. For example, a cross-border
M&A is a decision made by ¯rms that should in theory be the result of the prospect of
future synergies between ¯rms. Furthermore, these deals o®er ¯rms the ability to diversify
production abroad and save on various production costs. There is also the issue of risk
diversi¯cation. Normally, one associates risk diversi¯cation with the use of equity; however,
shareholders of ¯rms that invest abroad indirectly gain from the foreign investment of these
¯rms2. Therefore, given these and other issues associated with an ever globalizing world,
understanding what the determinants of these °ows are should be of interest for many policy
issues.
Though there has been a good deal of literature addressing the various consequences
and possible causes of domestic M&As3, practically no work has been done examining these
capital °ows at the international level. Two exceptions are Pryor (2001) who analyzes
some general trends of cross-border M&A °ows during the 1990s; and Vasconcellos and
Kish (1998), who examine Europe-U.S. °ows. This paper attempts to uncover the possible
determinants of these °ows empirically using a comprehensive framework. In particular, I
am interested in analyzing what macroeconomic and ¯nancial factors lie at the heart of these
1Given that I concentrate on announced deals in this paper, similar statistics are not reported here for
deals that came into e®ect. These numbers are available upon request.
2Rowland and Tesar (2000) show that there are gains from international diversi¯cation through multina-
tional ¯rms
3See Andrade, Mitchell and Sta®ord (2001) and Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) for recent surveys of such
research.
2°ows. Examples of the questions considered include the following: Do ¯nancially deep capital
markets play a signi¯cant role in acquisitions? Are ¯rm acquisitions driven by barriers to
trade in goods? Do tax di®erentials or exchange rate movements matter? Does information
play a role? Furthermore, I control for other possible determinants such as relative skill
abundance.
The key factor in this list on which I concentrate is the role of domestic ¯nancial markets
in providing incentive/capital for cross-border M&A deals. The 1990s witnessed a boom in
equity markets. Academics and the private sector have both pointed to this boom as spurring
on investment by ¯rms through mergers and acquisitions at the domestic level (see Section
2.1 for more on this). It is not immediately apparent that this e®ect should be large for
outward foreign investment, once control is made for other more `traditional' variables (e.g.,
skill di®erences). So, exploring this avenue is interesting on this ground alone. Moreover,
a positive result would point towards the importance of domestic ¯nancial markets in real
economic activity at an international level. Though the recent rise in equity prices is at the
heart of domestic stock market growth (as measured by the stock market capitalization to
GDP ratio in this paper), this result should nonetheless be of interest to policy makers from
countries with underdeveloped ¯nancial markets. By creating an institutional environment
conducive for domestic ¯nancial markets to grow | not only formal stock markets, but
also credit markets | policy makers will give their countries ability to reap the gains from
international ¯nancial investment. Furthermore, lessons from this paper may also be relevant
for Europe, where the consolidation of national ¯nancial centers across the Euro area has
begun and will lead to deeper ¯nancial markets.
The gravity model ¯ts the data well, though not as spectacularly as when used in esti-
mating trade °ow for goods as measured by its ability to explain total variation in the data,
i.e., the R2. However, several variables are signi¯cant both statistically and economically.
One very interesting result is the importance of ¯nancial deepening, measured by stock mar-
ket size relative to GDP, in the acquisition country's economy. Furthermore, the role of
3credit provided to the private sector by banks and other ¯nancial institutions, which is an
important source of ¯nance for developing countries, also seems to play a positive role for
the acquisition country. I am also able to incorporate other institutional factors; namely,
the e®ects of tax treaties and trade agreements. Bilateral capital tax treaties appear to in-
crease M&A activity between two countries, though this result is not statistically signi¯cant.
The type of regional trade agreement seems to matter and is robust across speci¯cations.
Namely, customs unions or free trade agreements tend to decrease cross-border investment
°ows, while service agreements work in the opposite direction.
Section 2 will discuss some of the key issues that will be considered, and will describe
some of the underlying theoretical background. Section 3 will describe the data and present
the econometric methodology. Section 4 provides empirical results. Finally, a conclusion is
presented.
2 Issues and Theoretical Background
FDI can be broken into two major components: investment in new assets in a foreign country
(commonly referred to as `green¯eld' investment), or acquisition of pre-existing foreign assets.
A cross-border M&A falls into the latter category, where a domestic ¯rm acquires another
¯rm in a foreign country4. Therefore, in what follows, I shall particularly concentrate on the
FDI literature for inspiration.
The literature on the incentives for FDI is vast and is not constrained to a particular
sub-¯eld of economics (see Markusen and Maskus (2001) for an excellent recent survey).
For example, research in trade examines the incentives for FDI given trade barriers, while
researchers who are interested in the distortionary e®ects of taxes on investment have also
raised this issue in the context of international capital °ows. Before proceeding to the
4A merger can also take place between the two ¯rms where there is no outright acquiring ¯rm. This issue
is not dealt with for two reasons. First, the data set does not di®erentiate between a merger or an acquisition
and always list a target and acquiror country. Second, very often what is announced as a merger initially
often turns out to be an acquisition ex post | the recent Daimler-Chrysler deal is a good case in point.
4empirical work, I will provide some background on the theoretical and empirical research
that have addressed these and other issues. This list will be far from complete, but will
concentrate on hypotheses that can actually be tested using the M&A data set and will
concentrate on macroeconomic and ¯nancial factors.
2.1 Financial Depth
The role of ¯nancial development has taken a prominent role in recent research in several
di®erent areas of the literature, such as economic growth, ¯nancial stability and international
¯nancial integration | see Caprio and Honohan (2001) for an excellent recent survey of this
literature. Financially deep markets | whether measured by size or liquidity | provide ¯rms
access to capital necessary to undertake investment projects which they might otherwise be
unable to take advantage of. Firms wishing to grow very often need to rely on external
¯nancing, therefore their ability to grow (as well as their incentive to) relies heavily on their
ease of access to cheap funds. Though ¯nancial development is more often associated with
developing countries, the growth of ¯nancial markets also has an impact in the industrial
world | witness the investment boom during the 1990s. This logic has been described in
the popular press5 as well as by the ¯nancial sector as a possible reason for the growth of
M&A activity in the past decade. For example, in commenting on the factors needed for
the revival of cross-border M&A to their 1998 boom-levels, Morgan Stanley highlights the
importance of ¯nancial factors:
² More vibrant global equity markets. We suspect cash will remain the king in terms of
¯nancing cross-border transactions over the near-term, although a rebound in world equity
markets could increase the viability of using equity to ¯nance deals. In addition, a rebound
in equity prices could boost con¯dence among CEOs to pursue mergers.6
Recent research has examined how di®erent domestic ¯nancial constraints played roles
in the emerging market crises of the late 1990s. My question di®ers from this line of study
5E.g., see The Economist, September 29, 2001, p. 64.
6\M&A Update { Nearing a Bottom?", Global Economic Forum, November 7, 2001.
http://www.morganstanley.com/gef/
5in that I am interested in how the ¯nancial deepening of a country can aid ¯rms in investing
abroad, rather than the impact on capital in°ows. This should be a question of interest for
policy makers given the importance of international diversi¯cation, whether it be by private
investors or ¯rms. By investing in another country's economy, ¯rms can hedge themselves
against domestic volatility, thereby smoothing their income streams. This mechanism should
also be important for developing countries as they grow and their ¯rms invest abroad.
Financial economists have also begun to ask what role ¯nancial markets might play in
explaining M&A activity. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (2001) develop a model to explain
the distinct waves of acquisitions since the 1960s where acquisitions are driven by the market
value of ¯rms. This work di®ers from the proposition stated above on two counts. First, the
authors are primarily concerned with domestic, in particular U.S., M&A activity. Second,
their theory belongs to the behavioural ¯nance models because acquisitions are driven by
the perceived synergy of the merged ¯rms relative to their present market values, whereas
the argument for ¯nancial development proposed above relates to the lifting of a ¯nancial
constraint faced by ¯rms.
Though Shleifer and Vishny (2001)'s model would be interesting to test with ¯rm-level
data, the present study is more concerned with addressing the issue of ¯nancial deepening.
Furthermore, my line of research will be easier to implement for a large cross-section of
countries using aggregated ¯nancial market data. Analyzing the role of ¯nancial deepening
in this area seems to be quite novel, though some empirical evidence addressing ¯nancial
incentives of cross-border deals has been provided by Vasconcellos and Kish (1998), who
examine how relative stock market performance and bond yield di®erentials a®ect Europe-
U.S. M&A activity. However, their work di®ers from the present study in several respects:
(i) they do not address the issue of ¯nancial deepening per se; (ii) they only concentrate on
¯nancial variables; (iii) a much smaller sample of countries is used, and (iv) their estimation
procedures are very di®erent from the ones implemented in this paper since the authors do
not have information on many deals, and no information at all on the value of these deals.
6Several measures of ¯nancial deepening have been proposed in the literature, and an
extensive database containing many of these data has recently been constructed by Beck,
DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Levine (1999). One common ¯nancial deepening variable used in many
studies (e.g., growth regressions) is the ratio of M2 to GDP. However, this variable is not
quite suitable for the issue at hand because it does not directly address the availability of
credit to the private sector. Therefore, two other measures are considered. The ¯rst is
a measure of stock market size relative to GDP. Testing the signi¯cance of this variable
directly addresses the in°uence of growing equity markets on cross-border investment °ows.
The 1990s witnessed a stupendous growth in stock market size and activity (see Table 3)
in the industrial world as well as the launching and growth of new markets in transition
and developing economies. However, it is well recognized that the banking sector plays
the primary role in providing funds for private sector investment in the developing world.
Therefore, the second measure of ¯nancial deepening considered is the amount of credit
provided by banks and other ¯nancial institutions to the private sector relative to GDP. It
would also be of interest to examine other organized markets, such as the domestic bond
market, but bond market capitalization data only exists for a relatively small sample of
countries.
2.2 Trade: M&A Deterrent (or Not)?
A stylized, and puzzling, fact in the trade literature is that world FDI and trade °ows tend
to move in the same direction, whereas standard trade theory generally predicts that the two
°ows should be substitutes of each other. Part of the intuition behind this theory relies on
¯rms needing to avoid trade costs, whether they be due to transportation or tari®s7. These
costs should in theory lead ¯rms to invest in a foreign economy. However, an interesting
recent paper by Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001) presents a theory where ¯rms engage in both
7See Mundell (1957) for early theoretical work addressing the relationship between trade and foreign
investment in the presence of barriers trade and investment. Economies of scale, ¯rm-speci¯c capital and
other considerations are also essential in a ¯rm's investment decision (e.g., see Markusen (1995) for a survey
on multinational enterprises).
7intra-industry FDI and intra-industry trade simultaneously. The combination of di®erenti-
ated goods and trade costs lead to this result. Though this result is not necessarily robust
across all industries in reality, the theory does provide some reasoning behind the empirical
positive correlation of trade and FDI.
Recent work on the multinational ¯rm also addresses the interaction between FDI and
trade °ows. Markusen, Venables, Eby-Konan and Zhang (1996) and Markusen (1997) pro-
vide theoretical models, referred to as \knowledge-capital" models, which allow for horizontal
and vertical integration of ¯rms across countries in the presence of trade costs and other fac-
tors. These models are quite complicated and rely on numerical simulations to provide
results and testable implications. Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) present a reduced
form model based on the knowledge-capital framework that can be tested empirically using
a±liation production as the measure of cross-country investment activity. The results in this
paper point to this new theory as being quite promising, as do other results highlighted in
Markusen and Maskus (2001). I do not use this empirical speci¯cation in the present paper
given that I am not concentrating on the multinational ¯rm per se, and my endogenous vari-
able di®ers from the one used in these studies. However, adopting this speci¯cation would
be an interesting avenue of future research.
This paper instead addresses the issue of trade vs. FDI empirically by using a gravity
model. If a cross-border M&A is acting as a substitute for trade then, ceteris paribus, a
natural result to expect would be a positive coe±cient for the distance between two countries
(which can be considered as a proxy for physical trade costs). However, the relationship
between distance and the cost of trade should be treated as partial at best for it says nothing
about trade policy. Furthermore, the cost of investment may also increase with distance,
therefore one might still expect a negative coe±cient for the distance variable. To attempt to
deal with this problem, I include a measure of bilateral trade as well as variables representing
di®erent types of regional trade agreements. I only have bilateral trade data up to 1997,
and the expected sign of its coe±cient is ambiguous given the various theoretical literature
8discussed above. However, the stylized fact of previous empirical literature points to an
expected positive sign. Therefore, this variable is primarily used to check the robustness of
the main results, e.g., whether the coe±cient on distance still remains signi¯cant. The e®ect
of trade agreements on FDI is not necessarily straightforward. One might expect that by
entering into a trade agreement, two countries will become more integrated economically and
therefore enter into more cross-border investment deals (and trade more as well). However,
trade agreements vary in their scope, e.g., a customs union imposes far greater conditions
on common tari®s then a service agreement. So, the relative \strength" of these deals might
have an e®ect on the incentive to replace FDI with trade (or vice versa). Furthermore, a
service agreement might very well stimulate cross-border deals because ¯rms whose main
source of business is the service sector will be able to take advantage of the lifting of various
restrictions. These variables do not address the issue of investment cost directly and I was
not able to collect such direct costs. However, certain proxies of costs have been suggested
in the literature, particularly information costs, which will next be addressed.
2.3 The Role of Information
The role of information has received attention recently in the international capital °ow liter-
ature. For example, Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) provide a model to explain the Feldstein-
Horioka puzzle that relies on the existence of asymmetric information between investors in
two countries as a central mechanism in the model8. Recent work by Martin and Rey (2001)
considers the importance of information costs in cross-border asset °ows. They endogenize
the incompleteness of ¯nancial markets and assume there exist some \iceberg" costs (trans-
action, information, etc.) in the trade of assets across countries. A direct implication from
this model is that gross bilateral asset °ow will be greater the smaller the transaction costs.
This model is also quite applicable in the case of M&As given that these deals are simply
another method for agents/¯rms to purchase the rights to future foreign output. Therefore,
8The model concentrates on green¯eld investment, but there also exists acquisition of existing ¯rms.
9information may also play an important role for gross M&A °ows9.
Portes and Rey (2001) put this idea to a test and provide strong empirical evidence on
the importance of information in determining gross bilateral equity °ows. They too use a
gravity model, but use two more speci¯c proxies of information than simply distance, namely
gross bilateral telephone tra±c and number of domestic bank branches located in the foreign
country. Another paper, which is even more related to M&A °ows is de M¶ enil (1999) who
applies a gravity model to bilateral FDI °ow for a small set of countries for the period
1982-1994. He relies on distance as a proxy for information, arguing that the sign of the
coe±cient for this variable will show whether information quality or avoiding trade costs are
more important in FDI decisions. I consider both distance and gross telephone tra±c in the
regressions presented below.
2.4 Taxes
Taxes a®ect the incentives of agents and ¯rms in all areas of economic activity, and FDI
is no di®erent. There is a large literature which examines the e®ect of di®erent types of
taxes on foreign investment °ows. For example Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1998) explore the
theoretical implications of taxing di®erent types of capital in°ows (portfolio, debt, and direct
investment). There is a large amount of empirical research exploring the impact of di®erent
forms of taxation on U.S. direct for investment in°ows and out°ows | see Hines Jr. (1997)
for an excellent survey of this literature. Many studies analyze a small number of countries,
and are able to focus attention on di®erent types of tax credits, some geared speci¯cally at
attracting foreign capital. Furthermore, issues such as double-taxation and multinational-
speci¯c taxes are tackled. Unfortunately it is not feasible to collect such speci¯c data given
the cross-country nature of this study. Therefore, as a proxy of tax e®ects, I examine the
average corporate tax rate of the target country. All else being equal, one would expect that
9The Martin-Rey model is primarily concerned with the importance of information for ¯nancial investors.
However, it is not farfetched to argue that ¯rms must invest heavily in information acquisition before deciding
on acquiring a foreign ¯rm and for future supervision.
10a country with a lower tax rate would attract investment. However, this measures does not
address tax credits, multinational-speci¯c taxes, or the issue of double taxation. Therefore,
results using this tax rate measure must not be treated as de¯nitive.
A second line of attack, one subject to less ambiguity in measurement problems, is to
examine the e®ect of tax treaties between two countries. Countries enter into such treaties
for several reasons. For example, a tax treaty will (i) enable a standardized set of de¯nitions
to be used and thereby strengthen tax jurisdiction between treaty partners; (ii) a®ect the
taxation of multinationals, such as eliminating double-taxation; (iii) promote the exchange
of tax information, thus enhancing the enforcement of tax laws, and (iv) prevent countries
from treaty shopping. These factors provide both positive and negative incentives for future
cross-border investment. On the one hand, ¯rms might be encouraged to invest abroad be-
cause treaties tend to lower taxes abroad in general. Furthermore, treaties can be tailored
to encourage FDI (e.g., by the elimination of double-taxation), and reduce the general un-
certainty of future tax regimes. On the other hand, incentives might fall because ¯rms no
longer have to operate in several countries to decrease their tax liability (e.g., through the
practice of transfer pricing). Moreover, ¯rms might have invested in low-tax countries in
the past, as well as in countries where they could easily misrepresent their revenues so as to
avoid taxes back home. I am aware of only one other paper that explores these issues | a
paper by Blonigen and Davies (2001) that examines U.S. inbound and outbound FDI with
65 countries over the period 1966-92. The authors employ the knowledge-capital speci¯ca-
tion discussed above and use foreign a±liate sales and FDI stocks as possible left-hand side
variables. They ¯nd that tax treaties actually have a negative e®ect on FDI.
2.5 The Exchange Rate
Does the exchange rate a®ect FDI? Some researchers have argued that exchange rate move-
ments may indeed. For example, work by Cushman (1985), Froot and Stein (1991), and
Blonigen (1997), present theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to explain why a
11U.S.$ depreciation might have played a role in the in°ow of foreign capital into the U.S.
during the 1980s. The three models explore di®erent channels of the e®ect of exchange rate
movements on FDI 10, but only Cushman (1985) considers exchange rate volatility, while the
other two only examine exchange rate depreciations/appreciations. All three theories predict
that a depreciation of the domestic currency should lead to an in°ow in foreign investment.
Klein and Rosengren (1994) put the Cushman factor-cost hypothesis vs. the Froot-Stein
wealth-e®ect hypothesis to a test, and ¯nd evidence of the wealth e®ect dominating. This
result is interesting for the present study given that the Klein and Rosengren (1994) measure
of relative wealth is the ratio of domestic and foreign stock market capitalizations. Therefore,
this variable is also considered to ensure that the ¯nancial variables discussed in Section 2.1
are not just behaving as proxies for the acquisition country's wealth. I also follow Klein and
Rosengren (1994) and use the contemporaneous real exchange rate.
The importance of exchange rate volatility has been stressed in the international trade
literature, and has been shown to be empirically important in recent work by Rose (2000)
that explores the e®ects of currency unions on bilateral trade °ows. Rose shows that the im-
pact of membership in a currency union on trade is large and signi¯cant. If FDI is acting as
a substitute for trade because of exchange rate volatility, then it might be expected that low
exchange rate volatility may actually have a negative e®ect on bilateral M&A °ows. Cush-
man (1985) examines this type of argument (and others) theoretically. He sets up a model
where the fact that ¯rms are risk averse may lead them to increasing FDI given exchange
rate volatility. However, he also presents di®erent cases of ¯rms' behaviour (e.g., as when
they intend to sell their product) where this volatility may in fact lead to decreased FDI. The
empirical results in this paper point towards FDI increasing with increased volatility, though
this does not hold across all speci¯cations. Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) build on this work
10Cushman (1985) concentrates on the e®ect of exchange movements on factor costs, such as labour;
Froot and Stein (1991) examine the role of credit market imperfections and the wealth e®ects on ¯rms due
to nominal exchange rate movements, while Blonigen (1997) stresses the importance of the valuation of
¯rm-speci¯c assets relative to movements in the real exchange rate.
12to examine the e®ect of real exchange rate volatility. They argue that one should care about
short-term volatility if the behaviour of ¯rms is being driven by their risk aversion. Their
model also predicts a positive relationship between FDI and volatility, though this result de-
pends on the assumptions made about the shocks hitting the economy. Therefore, answering
which direction exchange rate volatility a®ects cross-border M&A activity is ultimately an
empirical question. Finally, I do not use Rose (2000)'s currency union dummy variable given
the relatively short span of the M&A data set compared to Rose (2000)'s sample. There
is extremely little temporal variation of this variable during the 1990s, and this results in
multicollinearity in some speci¯cations, and near collinearity in the rest. Instead, I use a
5 year rolling measure of monthly nominal exchange rate changes volatility, prior to each
period t. Ultimately, I would like to use the real exchange rate volatility, but cannot given
that the price level data does not exist at the monthly level (and would be very limited at
the quarterly level).
2.6 Other Variables of Interest
The proceeding list of variables is far from complete, but concentrates on the ¯nancial and
macroeconomic factors underlying cross-border M&A °ows. However, the empirical model
can also be augmented with variables representing various similarities or di®erences between
countries. For example, relative skill abundance of countries plays an important role in the
trade-approach to FDI. It is not obvious what e®ect this variable might have on investment
in°ows (though the knowledge-capital model predicts higher a±liate sales in small skill-
abundant countries). A higher relative skill level might attract investment as ¯rms search
for productive labour to use. However, there is also the issue of comparative advantage,
where rich skill-abundant countries might be establishing ¯rms in poorer countries to take
advantage of unskilled but cheap labour. One would ultimately like to control for wage
di®erentials given this argument, but data from the International Labour Organization was
quite incomplete, and many of the series were not comparable across countries. Therefore,
13a measure of relative skill abundance based on a measure of aggregate human capital is
used. A dummy variable is constructed indicating whether the target country is more highly
skilled, as measured by the percentage of the population who have completed a higher
degree. More details on this variable are described below in Section 3.1. Furthermore, given
the importance of information highlighted above, a common language dummy is included.
This is meant to capture a country-pair speci¯c e®ect, and makes sense economically. For
example, the integration of a foreign ¯rm will most probably be more successful if managers
can communicate with each other. Therefore, one might expect to see language, for example,
play a role in a ¯rm's decision making process. Other standard variables included in the
gravity model are the size and prosperity of the two countries, measured in terms of real
income and real income per capita, are also included.
Finally, I also include OECD dummy variables among the possible controls, since the
sample includes less developed countries that make up a smaller share of the sample and
have many characteristics di®erent from their industrial counter-parts (e.g., political insta-
bility or corruption). Ideally, I would like to control for other important characteristics of
the countries more directly, such as relative wages, direct trade and investment costs, and
levels of corruption11, but cannot given data constraints. Therefore, rather than paring down
the number of countries in the sample signi¯cantly, such variables are not considered in the
present paper. Finally, the degree of domestic market M&A activity might a®ect the deci-
sions made by ¯rms about foreign acquisitions (e.g., di®erent strategic alliances). Obtaining
these data for so many countries was however simply not possible. However, by including
levels of real GDP in the regression, I address this issue somewhat if one believes that strong
economic performance contributes to increased activity in domestic M&As.
11See Wei (2000) on this point.
143 Data and Econometric Methodology
3.1 Data Description
I use several data sources in constructing the panel. The cross-border M&A data come from
a unique database produced by Thomson Financial Securities Data. In particular, I have the
following daily information for all deals in the world12 between January 1, 1990 and August
13, 2001:
² Announcement date,
² Date deal is e®ective,
² Target and acquiror ¯rms' names,
² Target and acquiror ¯rms' country of origin,
² Target and acquiror parent ¯rms' country of origin,
² Target and acquiror parent ¯rms' region,
² Target and acquiror ¯rms' industrial sector,
² Value of deal in U.S.$,
² Form of payment(s) used in deal, e.g., cash, stocks, etc., and
² Target and acquiror ¯nancial advisors.
This database began in 1985 and supposedly covers all deals in the world since 1990.
However, the one signi¯cant de¯ciency with this data set is that, since ¯rms do not have to
announce the value of a deal, not all deals have values attached to them. Speci¯cally, only
43.70% of the daily deals for my sample period have a value attached to them. Pryor (2001)
uses the same data source, but for a smaller number of years. He argues that most probably
the missing values are for smaller deals (where announced values are not widely known) and
therefore imputes the missing values using an arbitrary method. He simply assigns to a
missing value a quantity equal to 1/6th of a value for deals announced in the same industrial
sector and target/acquisition country groups. He ¯nds that this approximation does not
change the general trend compared to a sample ignoring the missing values. I chose not to
12See Table 5 for a list of countries in the sample.
15follow this methodology for several reasons. First, it is not certain whether the assumption
made by Pryor is correct. Second, I could not detect any patterns of which industry sectors,
countries or years, have more missing values than others. Therefore, the number of deals with
no values appear to be random given these criteria. Finally, I was told by a representative at
Thomson Financial that whether a deal is assigned a value or not depends on what appears
on the newswire or other sources that the analysts use to construct this data set. This points
to a random sample. I therefore treat whether a value is recorded or not as random and
simply aggregate the values which are reported annually. Furthermore, I only assign a value
of zero if no deals are announced in a given year. As can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, the
world number and value of these deals have been on the rise during the 1990s. Furthermore,
this pattern has not been exclusive to the developed world.
To investigate the importance of ¯nancial deepening I construct a stock market capital-
ization to GDP ratio. The data were originally compiled by Beck et al. (1999). However
their measure takes the average of period t and t ¡ 1 each year and ends in 1997, and it is
not entirely clear that a two-year average of the ratio is the appropriate measure to use when
measuring the impact of ¯nancial market deepening on M&A activity. Therefore, to avoid
potential complications when dealing with lags, I simply create the ratio of stock market
capitalization to GDP for each t for the period 1985-1999. The stock market capitalization
data are taken from Standard & Poor's (1995, 2000, 2001) and GDP data (denominated in
U.S.$) are from the World Bank's WDI. Given that several countries did not have organized
stock markets in the 1990s13, a large portion of the sample would be lost if this variable was
included. To circumvent this problem, a zero was entered each year for countries who did
not have a stock market for the whole sample. Furthermore, an exhaustive search was made
on the internet (see the appendix of Standard & Poor's (1995, 2000, 2001) for addresses) in
order to be sure that the missing values for some countries' markets were in fact missing,
13Out of 194 countries in my sample, only 101 countries had operating stock markets, and many of these
did not exist for the only time period examined.
16and not that the countries' markets had not begun functioning yet. In this latter case, a zero
was entered. The private credit to GDP ratio was constructed using data from the IMF's
International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. In particular, data for credit provided to
the private sector by banks and other ¯nancial institutions were used for the acquisition
country. See the appendix of Beck et al. (1999) for a detailed description of the data used
from the IFS. Finally, I take the log of the ratio of the target country's stock market capi-
talization to the natural logarithm of the acquisition country's stock market capitalization
(both in current U.S.$), as speci¯ed in Klein and Rosengren (1994).
Bilateral real exchange rate data are calculated using the end-of-year nominal exchange
rate and consumer price indices listed in the IFS database. The depreciation/appreciation
rates are calculated by taking the log di®erence of period t and period t ¡ 1. The volatility
measure of the nominal exchange rate is constructed as follows. First, the log di®erence
of end-of-month exchange rates are calculated from the IFS database. Next, the standard
deviation of this measured is calculated for 5 years prior to each period t, thus a rolling-
measure is calculated.
The O±ce of Tax Policy Research at the University of Michigan Business is about to
launch the World Tax Database on the internet. This data source will o®er comprehensive
information on di®erent tax rates for a sample of 150 countries. The average corporate tax
rate for every country has been made available to me for the period 1975-2001. Though
preliminary and incomplete, these data are used in the estimation below. In particular, the
target country's tax rate is used. Furthermore, information on whether two countries share
an income or capital tax treaty in a given year is collected from Tax Analysts (2001). These
data are simply coded as 0/1 dummies for each year. As one can see from Table 4, the
number of income and tax treaties has been increasing over the sample period.
A time-varying dummy variable is also constructed for whether countries are involved in a
regional trade agreement using information from the World Trade Organization. Additional
dummy variables are created representing the type of regional trade agreement in force. The
17four types are: (i) service agreement, (ii) free trade area, (iii) customs union, and (iv) other.
Table 4 shows that the number of these agreements were on the rise during the 1990s.
I turn to Glick and Rose (forthcoming) for some of the gravity data. These data o®er real
GDP and real GDP per capita, originating from the World Penn Tables and the World Bank.
However, since the data end in 1997 and my country pairs are not identical to theirs, I update
GDP and population ¯gures using the World Development Indicators (WDI) issued by the
World Bank. This can only be done until 1999 given data limitations. Therefore, the panel
I use is only for the period 1990-1999. The other two gravity variables that I consider is the
surface distance between two countries and a dummy variable indicating whether they share
a common language. The coordinates used to calculate distance are taken from the CIA
Factbook14, and the information on languages is taken from EITI. The information variable
is simply measured as gross bilateral telephone tra±c between two countries (the sum of the
two-way tra±c). The source of these data is the International Telecommunications Union15.
These data were available to me for the period 1990-98 and were quite incomplete, which
halves my sample size in the speci¯cations using this variable presented below. Therefore, I
treat these regressions primarily as a robustness check.
Finally, a measure of relative skill abundance is constructed using the human capital data
from Barro and Lee (2000). Speci¯cally, a country is considered to be relatively more skill
abundant if the percentage of higher school completed in the population (aged 15 years and
older) is greater than that in the other country. One should expect to see this percentage to
be much higher for industrial countries. A 0/1 coding is created accordingly. These data are
not ideal for this project given that they only have measures every 5 years. However, one
could argue that the relative skill abundance between two countries does not change greatly
over a 10-year period and some diagnostic checks con¯rm this result16. Therefore, skill-level
14See Appendix A for a list of websites where electronic data can be obtained.
15I would like thank Wei-Kang Wong for sharing these data with me.
16Regressions of Yt on Yt¡5 were run for the whole sample, where Y is the measure of skill considered. I
could not reject the null hypothesis that the coe±cient on Yt¡5 was signi¯cantly di®erent from 1.
18variable might only change over two periods: 1990-94 and 1995-99.
3.2 The Gravity Model
The gravity model is a simple empirical model which originated in the trade literature.
Brie°y stated, its main implication is that the gross °ow of trade between two countries
should depend inversely on the distance between the countries and depend proportionally
on their economic size (this is generally measured as the product of the two countries real
GDP). This model has been successful in the goods trade literature, and more recently in the
asset trade literature in the work of Portes and Rey (2001). Furthermore, de M¶ enil (1999)
points to its relevance in FDI °ows. Therefore, all econometric work will be built around
this speci¯cation using annual data.
The speci¯cation used augments the standard gravity-type variables (i.e., distance and
economic size) with other macroeconomic and ¯nancial variables. Furthermore, to avoid
possible problems of endogeneity, some independent variables are lagged. In particular, the
¯nancial market variables are lagged one period, since one could argue that an increase in
capital in°ows will boost domestic market activity and therefore have an e®ect on asset
prices and the availability of credit17. In particular the following equation is estimated:
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+ ¯17ln(Wealthij;t) + ¯18ln(Tradeij;t) + "ij;t;
where i and j denote the countries and t denotes time. The variables are de¯ned as follows:
² MAij;t: real M&A investment °ows from country j to i at time t,
² Y : real GDP,
17I was also concerned about the possible endogeneity of the real exchange rate, but some diagnostic checks
and recent work by Brooks, Edison, Kumar and Slok (2001) show that cross-border M&A activity have no
signi¯cant e®ect on exchange rate movements.
19² Pop: population,
² Dij: the distance between i and j,
² Telij: total gross telephone tra±c between i and j,
² StockMkt: real stock market capitalization,
² Credit: real credit provided to the private sector by banks and near-banks,
² RXR: real exchange rate of i w.r.t. j (Pi ¤ e=Pj),
² V (e): volatilty of monthly nominal exchange rate changes for 5 years prior to t,
² Taxi: the average corporate tax rate in country i at time t,
² captax: a binary variable equal to 1 if i and j share a capital tax treaty at time t,
² CU: a binary variable equal to 1 if i and j belong to a customs union (regional trade
agreement),
² FT: a binary variable equal to 1 if i and j belong to a free trade agreement (regional
trade agreement),
² SA: a binary variable equal to 1 if i and j belong to a service agreement (regional
trade agreement),
² Othert: a binary variable equal to 1 if i and j belong to other types of regional trade
agreements,
² Skill: a binary variable equal to 1 if i is more skilled than j and t,
² Lang: a binary variable equal to 1 if i and j have a common language,
² Wealth: country i's stock market capitalization divided by country j's,
² Tradeij;t: real goods trade °ow from country j to i at time t,
² ¯0: a vector of nuisance coe±cients (constant, OECD dummies, and annual dummies),
and
² "ij;t: an error term, which is assumed to be distributed N(0;¾2).
Given the discussion in Section 2, one can summarize the expected signs for the coe±-







































Equation (1) could easily be estimated using various panel econometric techniques (e.g.,
random e®ects), but this ignores two rather serious complications with the data. The ¯rst
problem is that for many country-pairs the gross bilateral °ows of M&As is zero for a given
year. That is to say there are no deals recorded from country j to country i18. Unfortunately,
the log of zero does not exist, so many observations would be lost by using the log-log
speci¯cation in (1). Therefore, an appropriate transformation must be made to the dependent
variable. The second problem is that the data are censored at zero. In other words, it is
quite possible that ¯rms might wish to disinvest from a country (i.e., the gross bilateral
M&A °ow is in fact negative), but this is not observed in the data and is instead recorded
as a zero. Therefore, I account for this problem using an appropriate censoring model.




¸ if ¸ 6= 0;
ln(y) if ¸ = 0;
(2)
18This di®ers from deals being announced in a given year but no value being announced. In this case, the
observation is treated as a missing value.
21for y > 0, where y represents the M&A °ow, and ¸ is a parameter chosen to maximize a
given criteria (the right-hand side variables remain in log-form, though). A more general
function, which allows for the possibility of negative y's is de¯ned by Bickel and Doksum
(1981). Though this function is more appropriate to use given the censoring problem (i.e.,
possible unobserved negative M&A °ows), the negative term drops out of the censoring
model considered, so the standard Box-Cox transformation su±ces. Next, the censoring
problem can be de¯ned simply as:
y =
(
0 if y¤ · 0;
y¤ otherwise;
(3)
where y¤ is the unobserved \latent" value of M&A °ows. It is quite straightforward to derive
the likelihood for this problem given (2), (3) and the assumption of normality for the errors
in (1). The resulting likelihood is non-linear in ¸, which results in some computational
di±culties. Therefore, the model is estimated taking ¸ as a ¯xed parameter. A simple grid
search over a range of ¸'s is used to choose the ¸ which yields the highest estimated likelihood
of the estimated model. This is initially done for the pooled regression and the ¸ chosen is
then used for the rest of the regressions to be consistent. The derivation of the likelihood
function and further discussion of estimation is presented in Appendix B.
The Box-Cox transformation is not the only way to deal with the zero problem. Another
method that is explored is to replace ln(M&A) with ln(1 + M&A). This method is not
perfect, given that adding a one to a small number has much larger e®ects than when added
to a large number, but is also considered as robustness check. Finally, non-censored OLS
and panel results are also presented initially for ln(M&A), the Box-Cox transformation, and
ln(1 + M&A), to have an idea of the e®ect of using censored data. This is particularly
important in this study given that only 20% of the data are uncensored after taking the
appropriate transformations.
224 Results
Before proceeding with the estimation results, it is worthwhile to describe brie°y how the
coe±cients should be interpreted. If the speci¯cation is ln(y) = ln(X)¯ (or X¯ in case of




xi , so the coe±cients
can be interpreted as elasticities. This does not follow exactly when using the Box-Cox
transformation since it is only an approximation of the log function. As it turns out, the
coe±cients for most of the variables are quite a bit larger in the Tobit models than for
the regression using only non-censored data. However, the increase in size from using the
Tobit model is not only an artifact of the transformation, since coe±cients also increase
when using the transformed variables in regressions that ignore censoring but use the zeroes.
These coe±cients increase as well, but not as much as when using the Tobit speci¯cation.
This is also true for the ln(1 + y) transformation, though the coe±cients are smaller than
the Box-Cox transformation. Therefore, the coe±cients in the Tobit models should only be
interpreted as approximate percentage changes, and should be scaled downwards.
The \optimal" ¹ ¸ is found to equal 0.0576 by estimating the pooled Tobit regressions.
This result was obtained from running the Tobit model over several values of ¸, re¯ning the
numerical search iteratively until the largest likelihood is obtained. This is a valid procedure
since the Box-Cox transformation is an increasing, monotonic function of ¸, and the Tobit
likelihood has a global maximum. Finally, results for the ln(1 + M&A) speci¯cation are
presented in Appendix C for the purpose of clarity.
4.1 Pooled Results
I ¯rst examine the results from running regressions with the pooled data that can be found
in Tables 6-8. Tables 6 and 7 do not account for censoring, while Tables 8 does. To address
the concern that there might be country-pair e®ects a®ecting the variance of the shocks, I
control for heteroskedasticity by using weights based on country-pairs19. I also control for
19Breusch-Pagan tests for heteroskedasticity shows that this is a valid concern.
23possible time e®ects by including annual dummies that are not reported (the constant term
is also excluded). Five di®erent speci¯cations are considered in the regressions. Speci¯cation
(1) is the baseline speci¯cation. I augment this speci¯cation with the telephone call tra±c
variable in speci¯cation (2) to account for possible investment costs, so as to judge whether
the distance variable still proxies for some investment costs. Speci¯cation (3) includes the
wealth variable. This speci¯cation is quite important for judging whether stock market depth
and private credit really drive the M&A °ows, or whether they are simply acting as proxies
for the acquisition country's wealth relative to the target country's. Finally, speci¯cations
(4) and (5) include the goods trade variable, that tests explicitly whether M&As and trade
are complements or substitutes, as well as testing whether the e®ect of trade agreements
disappear. Speci¯cation (5) also includes the telephone variable to judge how the trade and
distance coe±cients are a®ected.
Overall, the ¯ts of all the regressions are decent, though the R2 is smaller for the Tobit
models20. The ¯rst fact to note is the positive e®ect that ¯nancially deeper markets in the
acquisition countries have on M&A °ows. The lagged value of stock market capitalization
to GDP in the acquisition country has a positive and signi¯cant e®ect in all three models.
Examining column (1) of Tables 6-8, one sees that a 1% increase in this ratio would result
in an increase of 0.5% to 17.36% increase in cross-border M&A activity. As discussed above,
this 17.36% in Table 8 is an in°ated number. However, the ln(1 + M&A) transformation
(see Table 13 in Appendix C) also points to a large elasticity, and 17.36% represents almost
a 6 time increase compared to the OLS result of Table 7. Credit provided to the private
sector by banks and near-banks also appears to be important in stimulating cross-border
°ows, though the coe±cients are much smaller than the stock market ones, and are not
statistically signi¯cant for the standard gravity model of Table 6, nor for some of the Tobit
speci¯cations. It is also interesting to note that both the stock market and credit coe±cients
are largest when I control for the possible wealth e®ect in speci¯cation (2). The most probable
20Note that the pseudo R2 is calculated as 1 - LogLikelihood/(LogLikelihood of the Constant only model).
24reason for this is that speci¯cation (2) drops observations where the target country has zero
stock market capitalization due to the log transformation of the wealth variable. With this
caveat aside, it would appear that capital provided by stock markets play a relatively more
important role than bank credit in ¯nancing cross-border M&A deals.
The real exchange rate (RXR) does not appear to have any e®ect on M&A activity in
the pooled results. Coe±cients are economically small in all the tables and statistically in-
signi¯cant. Furthermore, the signs on the coe±cients vary across the di®erent speci¯cations.
The coe±cient for the wealth variable is only signi¯cant in the regression run in Table 6
(speci¯cation (3)), and its sign is positive, which is opposite to the result found in Klein and
Rosengren (1994) and the theory of Froot and Stein (1991). However, the sign is reversed
when the sample size is increased in Table 7, and is not statistically signi¯cant in the pooled
Tobit regressions. Results for nominal exchange rate volatility (V(e)) are ambiguous. The
standard regressions in Table 6 show that volatility has a positive and statistical (though
not really economic) signi¯cant e®ect on cross-border M&As as has been found in previous
work. However, this result does not hold up to increased sample size nor taking account the
censoring problem. Therefore, it does not appear that the exchange rate has a large e®ect
on cross-border M&A °ows, unlike in the case of goods trade.
Higher tax rates in the target country have rather strong negative e®ects on inward M&A
°ows | a 1% increase in the average corporate tax rate will dampen in°ows from anywhere
between 0.552% to 9.926%, depending on the speci¯cation. Again, the 9.926% is a very high
upper-bound. However, the strong results are interesting to note and make sense, though
one should take them with a grain of salt given that only an average corporate tax rate is
used as an explanatory variable. Capital tax treaties appears to play a positive role in cross-
border investment °ows21. This contradicts the results of Blonigen and Davies (2001), and
seems to indicate that the potential e®ects of lower taxes, elimination of double taxation and
other bene¯ts of these treaties, might be stronger than the negative e®ects discussed above.
21Similar results were found when using income tax treaties.
25However, the results found in this study are not statistically signi¯cant, so one cannot arrive
at any de¯nitive conclusions.
The other institutional variables considered are the regional trade agreements. Both
customs unions and free trade agreements have a negative and signi¯cant e®ect on M&A
°ows in Table 7 as well as the Tobit estimations, though these results do not follow from the
simple OLS. Therefore, the incentives to trade resulting from the treaties have a tendency to
decrease the incentive for cross-border investment; e.g., there is no longer the need for \tari®-
jumping". However, service agreements and other trade agreements appear to have positive
e®ects on the capital °ows. The positive coe±cient on the service agreement variable points
to the importance of economic integration provided by these agreements, such as possible
movements of human capital (e.g., banking services). Summing the coe±cients of these four
agreements appears, however, to wash out to zero. Finally, these results are robust to the
inclusion of actual trade between the two countries as seen in speci¯cations (4) and (5), and
the coe±cient on the trade variable is positive and signi¯cant, which conforms to the stylize
fact of complementary between the °ows of direct investment and goods found in previous
empirical research.
The coe±cients for distance, telephone call tra±c, real GDP, real GDP per capital, and
common language variables all have the expected signs in almost all speci¯cations for the
pooled OLS and Tobit regressions. The one exception is in Table 6, where the coe±cient
on distance actually becomes positive, though insigni¯cant, when trade is included. It is
interesting that the distance e®ect is not wiped out by the telephone call tra±c variables as in
Portes and Rey (2001). This would imply that there are other investment costs, which are not
being picked up by the telephone proxy. This result is robust to including the trade variable
as in speci¯cation (4). However, both the coe±cients on distance and telephone tra±c
decrease in magnitude when trade is included, though both remain signi¯cant. Therefore,
the two variables appear to be capturing possible costs to investment, but also pick up
the complementarity between trade and M&As when trade is left out of the speci¯cation.
26Meanwhile, the common language e®ect is particularly strong. Finally, the coe±cients on
the skill and OECD variables appear to change when comparing the models taking into
account the censored data and the simple linear speci¯cation, which do not. In all tables an
OECD acquisition country (OECDj) has a positive e®ect on M&A activity is not a terribly
surprising result given that most of these deals involved industrial countries. However, the
coe±cient on the target OECD variable (OECDi) changes signs and becomes negative in
Tables 7 and 8, but is not statistically signi¯cant. The same pattern emerges for the human
capital variable. According to the pooled OLS results (Table 6), a country will invest in
countries which are relatively more skill abundant, but this results is reversed when the
censored data are considered (though, this result is not statistically signi¯cant for the Tobit
models). This change in sign may occur because the expanded data set (compared to the one
used to generate the results in Table 6) includes many more developing country, and the skill
variable may therefore also be capturing possible e®ects of lower labour costs. Therefore,
this concern and the crude measure of human capital makes me wary of how robust the
coe±cients for the skill variable are.
4.2 Random E®ects Results | A Robustness Check
I also estimate equation (1) using a random e®ects model to take advantage of having
a large panel available, and to check for robustness. As for the pooled regressions, I ¯rst
estimate the model ignoring the censoring problem and then estimate a random e®ects Tobit
model. A ¯xed e®ect regression could also be estimated, but Hausman tests rejected this
speci¯cation. Furthermore, some of the ¯xed e®ects (distance and OECD dummy variables)
would be dropped from the regression. The results from the random e®ects speci¯cations are
in Tables 9-11. Time dummy variables and a constant are also included in these regressions,
but are not reported as in the pooled regressions.
The results are very similar to those in the pooled regressions, which is a nice robustness
check. Some di®erences can be seen, though. For example, the exchange rate volatility
27coe±cients for the pooled regression in Table 6 are statistically signi¯cant, but this is not
the case in the random e®ects model in Table 9. The sign on the coe±cient for the volatility
variable also changes when comparing the pooled Tobit regressions in Table 8 with the
random e®ect Tobit results in Table 11. The coe±cients are negative for all speci¯cations in
the random e®ects models (i.e., the signs change for speci¯cations (3)-(5)). Furthermore, the
negative coe±cients are actually statistically signi¯cant for the random e®ects Tobit models.
These di®ering results do not leave me with much con¯dence regarding the e®ect of exchange
rate volatility on M&A °ows, and warrants further research. However, given that the e®ect
of this variable is not the central issue of this study, I leave this for future work. Finally,
the coe±cients for the stock market capitalization and credit ratios remain positive, large,
and signi¯cant. This fact and results from the pooled regressions leave me con¯dent that
¯nancial deepening does play an important role in cross-border M&A activity.
5 Conclusion
This paper attempts to determine some of the factors underlying gross cross-border M&A
°ows for the period 1990-1999. A simple gravity model is estimated, controlling for possible
bias caused by censored data. Empirical results highlighting the importance of ¯nancially
deep markets appear to be encouraging. Furthermore, regional trade agreements are also
signi¯cant driving variables, though the type of trade agreement matters: custom unions and
free trade agreements work against cross-border M&A activity, while service agreements have
a positive e®ect. Information, trade and a common language also seem to have a positive
impact.
M&A °ows are preeminent in the industrial world, but as emerging markets continue
to liberalize and foreign ¯rms are allowed to invest in them, these °ows should play more
important roles in international integration. Furthermore, as developing countries continue
to develop ¯nancially deeper markets, their ¯rms will also have the opportunity to diversify
abroad, and acquiring foreign ¯rms might be one way of doing so. Therefore, the results
28in this paper should be seen as encouraging for policy makers who are pursuing such goals.
Finally, the usual caveat of missing variables must be made when using a large cross-country
panel. I am sure other country-speci¯c variables, such as investment barriers, corruption,
political instability or wage data also play an important role in FDI decisions, but collecting
these data for a large number of countries over several years was not feasible. Hopefully
including OECD dummies help control for these ¯xed e®ects. These issues should be consid-
ered when interpreting the results in this paper. This caveat aside, I believe that this paper
is a promising step in examining the relationship between ¯nancial deepening and capital
°ows and further work should be done exploring the e®ects of these variables at a deeper
level.
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31Table 1: World Gross M&A Flows Announced (Current $U.S. billions)
OECD Other OECD
Year World w/ OECD w/ Other w/ Other
1990 140.75 108.32 1.96 30.47
1991 69.49 51.99 1.43 16.07
1992 79.47 49.19 1.88 28.40
1993 91.85 57.23 5.84 28.78
1994 110.53 86.45 3.74 20.33
1995 196.98 156.83 5.29 34.86
1996 209.68 143.79 11.60 54.29
1997 330.61 206.85 20.31 103.45
1998 581.76 444.02 15.37 122.37
1999 1018.63 798.30 9.93 210.39
Table 2: World M&A Deals Announced
OECD Other OECD
Year World w/ OECD w/ Other w/ Other
1990 2452 1930 38 484
1991 2856 2132 86 638
1992 2567 1877 76 614
1993 2769 1904 169 696
1994 3432 2208 208 1016
1995 4205 2805 245 1155
1996 4515 2859 304 1352
1997 4998 3222 347 1429
1998 5835 3789 369 1677
1999 6741 4360 346 2035
Note: 43.70% of daily deals in the data set have values. However, when aggregated across countries
93.30% of the sample have values ¸ 0. Source: Thomson Financial.
32Table 3: World Stock Market Capitalization (Current $U.S. billions)
Year World OECD Other
1990 9399.70 8879.00 520.70
1991 11347.46 10536.91 810.55
1992 10932.89 10022.91 909.99
1993 14016.96 12318.41 1698.55
1994 15124.36 13285.65 1838.71
1995 17788.39 15859.49 1928.90
1996 20252.66 17829.61 2423.05
1997 23115.24 20807.66 2307.57
1998 26992.91 25027.42 1965.49
1999 36150.48 33200.65 2949.83
Source: Standard and Poor's Emerging Market Factbook.
Table 4: Number of World Bilateral Tax Treaties and Regional Trade Agreements in E®ect
Capital Income Customs Free Trade Service Other Trade
Year Tax Treaty Tax Treaty Union Agreement Agreement Agreement
1990 415 913 205 245 67 1265
1991 430 957 214 235 66 1267
1992 452 1001 215 272 66 1346
1993 507 1084 215 312 66 1347
1994 561 1182 215 427 170 1532
1995 599 1276 263 549 243 1549
1996 672 1397 278 570 243 1549
1997 722 1476 281 616 244 1549
1998 749 1525 281 645 244 1549
1999 772 1562 281 658 244 1549
Sources: Tax Analysts' Worldwide Tax Treaty Index or http://treaties.tax.org/ and the WTO
(http://www.wto.org/english/trato e/region e/region e.htm).
33Table 5: Countries with M&A Data
Abu Dhabi Cook Islands India Monaco Spain
Albania Costa Rica Indonesia Mongolia Sri Lanka
Algeria Croatia Iran Morocco St Kitts&Nevis
Andorra Cuba Ireland-Rep Mozambique Sudan
Angola Cyprus Isle of Man Myanmar(Burma) Surinam
Antigua Czech Republic Israel Namibia Swaziland
Argentina Czechoslovakia Italy Nepal Sweden
Armenia Denmark Ivory Coast Neth Antilles Switzerland
Aruba Dominica Jamaica Netherlands Syria
Australia Dominican Rep Japan New Zealand Taiwan
Austria East Germany Jersey Nicaragua Tajikistan
Azerbaijan Ecuador Jordan Niger Tanzania
Bahamas Egypt Kazakhstan Nigeria Thailand
Bahrain El Salvador Kenya North Korea Togo
Bangladesh Equator Guinea Kuwait Norway Tonga
Barbados Eritrea Kyrgyzstan Oman Trinidad&Tobago
Belarus Estonia Laos Pakistan Tunisia
Belgium Ethiopia Latvia Panama Turkey
Belize Fiji Lebanon Papua N Guinea Turkmenistan
Benin Finland Lesotho Paraguay Uganda
Bermuda Fr Polynesia Liberia Peru Ukraine
Bhutan France Libya Philippines United Kingdom
Bolivia Gabon Liechtenstein Poland United States
Bosnia Georgia Lithuania Portugal Upper Volta
Botswana Germany Luxembourg Puerto Rico Uruguay
Brazil Ghana Macau Qatar Utd Arab Em
Brunei Gibraltar Macedonia Romania Uzbekistan
Bulgaria Greece Madagascar Russian Fed Vanuatu
C. African Rep Greenland Malawi Rwanda Venezuela
Cambodia Grenada Malaysia Saudi Arabia Vietnam
Cameroon Guatemala Maldives Senegal Virgin Islands
Canada Guernsey Mali Sierra Leone Western Somoa
Cape Verde Guinea Malta Singapore Yemen
Cayman Islands Guyana Marshall Is Slovak Rep Yugoslavia
Chad Haiti Martinque Slovenia Zaire
Chile Honduras Mauritania Solomon Is Zambia
China Hong Kong Mauritius South Africa Zimbabwe
Colombia Hungary Mexico South Korea
Congo-Rep Iceland Moldova Soviet Union
34Table 6: Pooled OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(StockMkt/Y)j;t¡1 0.449 0.305 0.512 0.361 0.294
(0.081)*** (0.096)*** (0.086)*** (0.089)*** (0.099)***
(Credit/Y)j;t¡1 0.064 -0.022 0.143 -0.036 -0.072
(0.110) (0.128) (0.113) (0.118) (0.132)
RXR -0.012 0.008 -0.002 0.012 0.014
(0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
V(e) 0.106 0.168 0.131 0.142 0.196
(0.061)* (0.073)** (0.063)** (0.065)** (0.076)**
Taxi -0.552 -0.641 -0.566 -0.552 -0.667
(0.192)*** (0.243)*** (0.199)*** (0.195)*** (0.242)***
Capital Tax Treaty 0.164 0.034 0.159 0.198 0.024
(0.163) (0.181) (0.164) (0.155) (0.173)
Customs Union 0.108 -0.631 0.057 -0.011 -0.455
(0.247) (0.372)* (0.247) (0.268) (0.356)
Free Trade Agr. 0.194 -0.301 0.143 0.158 -0.213
(0.203) (0.268) (0.207) (0.217) (0.268)
Service Agr. 0.495 1.143 0.485 0.485 0.922
(0.235)** (0.312)*** (0.238)** (0.230)** (0.290)***
Other Trade Agr. 0.597 0.816 0.540 0.574 0.744
(0.235)** (0.267)*** (0.253)** (0.231)** (0.271)***
Skill 0.388 0.244 0.355 0.308 0.244
(0.128)*** (0.153) (0.126)*** (0.130)** (0.149)
Language 1.037 0.585 1.082 0.913 0.604
(0.107)*** (0.142)*** (0.110)*** (0.110)*** (0.142)***
YiYj 0.286 0.333 0.282 0.097 0.217
(0.034)*** (0.040)*** (0.035)*** (0.043)** (0.064)***
(YiYj)/(PopiPopj) 0.039 0.073 -0.016 -0.026 0.024
(0.071) (0.097) (0.078) (0.073) (0.098)
Distance -0.213 -0.077 -0.250 0.016 0.016







OECDi 0.314 0.260 0.265 0.486 0.349
(0.158)** (0.205) (0.160)* (0.157)*** (0.199)*
OECDj 0.732 0.504 0.910 0.699 0.575
(0.159)*** (0.201)** (0.180)*** (0.166)*** (0.199)***
Observations 2767 1504 2699 2200 1454
R2 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.25 0.28
Notes: See text. All variables (except dummies) are in logs. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
35Table 7: Box-Cox Pooled OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(StockMkt/Y)j;t¡1 2.595 2.522 2.688 2.106 2.110
(0.257)*** (0.336)*** (0.338)*** (0.248)*** (0.334)***
(Credit/Y)j;t¡1 1.590 1.605 1.754 1.332 1.598
(0.387)*** (0.539)*** (0.403)*** (0.357)*** (0.517)***
RXR 0.013 0.040 0.044 0.030 0.038
(0.081) (0.110) (0.086) (0.081) (0.109)
V(e) -0.122 -0.136 0.055 0.171 0.107
(0.316) (0.451) (0.351) (0.340) (0.456)
Taxi -2.283 -2.584 -3.217 -1.421 -2.052
(0.733)*** (1.034)** (0.870)*** (0.701)** (0.991)**
Capital Tax Treaty 1.398 1.768 1.376 0.960 1.712
(1.070) (1.358) (1.073) (1.038) (1.342)
Customs Union -2.953 -5.333 -2.937 -4.472 -5.367
(1.501)** (1.806)*** (1.537)* (1.589)*** (1.828)***
Free Trade Agr. -1.268 -3.630 -1.283 -0.874 -3.252
(1.378) (1.678)** (1.403) (1.420) (1.677)*
Service Agr. 6.303 8.392 6.575 7.331 8.385
(1.519)*** (1.942)*** (1.534)*** (1.579)*** (1.921)***
Other Trade Agr. 0.845 2.083 0.177 1.335 2.067
(0.941) (1.355) (0.971) (0.949) (1.386)
Skill -0.885 -2.016 -0.787 -1.174 -1.913
(0.645) (0.899)** (0.662) (0.640)* (0.907)**
Language 7.200 5.041 8.099 6.135 4.811
(0.729)*** (0.921)*** (0.779)*** (0.712)*** (0.916)***
YiYj 2.840 3.106 2.900 1.583 2.147
(0.155)*** (0.205)*** (0.160)*** (0.197)*** (0.289)***
(YiYj)/(PopiPopj) 1.329 1.585 1.070 1.157 1.443
(0.294)*** (0.460)*** (0.325)*** (0.318)*** (0.449)***
Distance -4.209 -3.630 -4.212 -2.803 -2.595







OECDi -0.067 -0.481 -0.180 0.490 -0.678
(0.743) (1.108) (0.792) (0.758) (1.102)
OECDj 2.682 1.633 3.241 2.080 1.179
(0.716)*** (0.991)* (0.836)*** (0.710)*** (0.983)
Observations 13434 6298 12476 10962 6066
R2 0.30 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.34
¹ ¸ 0.0576 0.0576 0.0576 0.0576 0.0576
Notes: See text. All variables (except dummies) are in logs. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
36Table 8: Box-Cox Pooled Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(StockMkt/Y)j;t¡1 17.359 15.288 17.720 14.506 12.793
(1.577)*** (1.945)*** (1.688)*** (1.620)*** (1.930)***
(Credit/Y)j;t¡1 7.380 3.440 8.472 3.113 2.060
(2.494)*** (2.834) (2.648)*** (2.213) (2.500)
RXR -0.144 0.031 -0.062 0.254 0.124
(0.310) (0.373) (0.316) (0.313) (0.365)
V(e) -0.591 -1.067 0.684 1.072 0.188
(1.220) (1.508) (1.284) (1.375) (1.522)
Taxi -7.267 -7.499 -9.926 -2.530 -4.475
(2.844)** (3.594)** (3.135)*** (2.841) (3.462)
Capital Tax Treaty 2.802 3.517 2.532 1.632 4.188
(3.259) (3.780) (3.185) (3.083) (3.645)
Customs Union -12.392 -14.915 -11.881 -17.556 -15.696
(4.921)** (5.798)** (4.858)** (5.362)*** (5.881)***
Free Trade Agr. -10.898 -17.612 -10.919 -8.709 -15.426
(5.167)** (5.531)*** (5.190)** (5.224)* (5.529)***
Service Agr. 10.464 11.630 11.317 11.232 11.304
(4.739)** (5.710)** (4.664)** (5.080)** (5.717)**
Other Trade Agr. 12.248 19.879 8.276 12.406 17.376
(4.715)*** (5.506)*** (4.595)* (4.568)*** (5.252)***
Skill 1.368 -2.724 1.462 -1.335 -3.577
(2.539) (3.154) (2.512) (2.476) (3.112)
Language 22.835 12.004 24.934 18.075 11.573
(2.460)*** (2.954)*** (2.545)*** (2.394)*** (2.941)***
YiYj 11.402 10.533 11.037 3.876 4.827
(0.551)*** (0.711)*** (0.582)*** (0.999)*** (1.235)***
(YiYj)/(PopiPopj) 5.641 6.025 4.250 4.054 4.944
(1.498)*** (2.113)*** (1.671)** (1.675)** (1.931)**
Distance -19.755 -12.935 -19.709 -11.116 -7.376







OECDi -4.080 -2.886 -5.097 -1.844 -4.434
(3.136) (4.064) (3.143) (3.201) (3.903)
OECDj 19.376 16.650 21.145 18.404 15.038
(3.424)*** (3.976)*** (3.875)*** (3.399)*** (3.890)***
Observations 13434 6298 12476 10962 6066
Log-Likelihood -17675.82 -9304.72 -17092.01 -13909.10 -8946.05
Constant LogL -19912.86 -10545.33 -19268.30 -15889.29 -10186.23
pseudo R2 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12
¹ ¸ 0.0576 0.0576 0.0576 0.0576 0.0576
Notes: See text. All variables (except dummies) are in logs. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
37Table 9: Random E®ects OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(StockMkt/Y)j;t¡1 0.453 0.321 0.517 0.391 0.312
(0.077)*** (0.099)*** (0.081)*** (0.086)*** (0.101)***
(Credit/Y)j;t¡1 0.005 -0.040 0.046 -0.060 -0.098
(0.104) (0.129) (0.107) (0.117) (0.132)
RXR -0.016 0.003 -0.008 0.005 0.007
(0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021)
V(e) 0.078 0.131 0.095 0.069 0.131
(0.061) (0.079)* (0.062) (0.069) (0.082)
Taxi -0.481 -0.580 -0.503 -0.519 -0.601
(0.177)*** (0.237)** (0.185)*** (0.194)*** (0.242)**
Capital Tax Treaty 0.158 0.151 0.153 0.246 0.136
(0.139) (0.180) (0.142) (0.150)* (0.181)
Customs Union 0.012 -0.744 -0.017 -0.066 -0.584
(0.246) (0.331)** (0.248) (0.272) (0.343)*
Free Trade Agr. 0.077 -0.477 0.040 0.076 -0.364
(0.198) (0.258)* (0.201) (0.214) (0.263)
Service Agr. 0.350 1.034 0.310 0.377 0.832
(0.218) (0.289)*** (0.219) (0.242) (0.302)***
Other Trade Agr. 0.520 0.658 0.457 0.483 0.638
(0.237)** (0.291)** (0.248)* (0.258)* (0.296)**
Skill 0.262 0.166 0.230 0.256 0.183
(0.115)** (0.153) (0.118)* (0.123)** (0.153)
Language 0.957 0.673 1.000 0.894 0.687
(0.109)*** (0.149)*** (0.113)*** (0.117)*** (0.150)***
YiYj 0.234 0.285 0.230 0.095 0.183
(0.029)*** (0.039)*** (0.031)*** (0.043)** (0.059)***
(YiYj)/(PopiPopj) -0.020 0.020 -0.063 -0.065 -0.021
(0.064) (0.092) (0.068) (0.077) (0.096)
Distance -0.239 -0.197 -0.275 -0.061 -0.097







OECDi 0.333 0.268 0.270 0.459 0.336
(0.155)** (0.202) (0.161)* (0.168)*** (0.205)
OECDj 0.792 0.630 0.939 0.744 0.720
(0.160)*** (0.215)*** (0.180)*** (0.177)*** (0.217)***
Observations 2767 1504 2699 2200 1454
R2 Overall 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.27
R2 Between 0.19 0.25 0.19 0.21 0.25
R2 Within 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05
Notes: See text. All variables (except dummies) are in logs. Standard errors in parentheses.
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
38Table 10: Box-Cox Random E®ects OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(StockMkt/Y)j;t¡1 1.878 1.988 2.017 1.390 1.658
(0.204)*** (0.294)*** (0.242)*** (0.221)*** (0.302)***
(Credit/Y)j;t¡1 1.414 1.347 1.496 1.289 1.095
(0.279)*** (0.418)*** (0.291)*** (0.295)*** (0.422)***
RXR -0.053 -0.034 -0.002 0.008 0.001
(0.084) (0.107) (0.087) (0.084) (0.107)
V(e) -0.294 -0.703 -0.124 -0.523 -0.695
(0.226) (0.340)** (0.249) (0.255)** (0.350)**
Taxi -0.989 -0.964 -2.208 -0.419 -0.530
(0.593)* (0.873) (0.728)*** (0.641) (0.882)
Capital Tax Treaty 2.178 1.508 2.172 1.451 1.339
(0.774)*** (1.055) (0.801)*** (0.805)* (1.054)
Customs Union -1.435 -2.677 -1.462 -2.767 -3.103
(1.043) (1.349)** (1.074) (1.143)** (1.410)**
Free Trade Agr. -0.003 -1.011 -0.122 0.249 -1.142
(0.952) (1.259) (0.976) (1.026) (1.283)
Service Agr. 2.726 3.169 2.867 3.467 3.404
(0.995)*** (1.324)** (1.028)*** (1.083)*** (1.368)**
Other Trade Agr. 0.742 2.167 0.219 1.509 2.073
(1.026) (1.305)* (1.076) (1.044) (1.326)
Skill -1.520 -2.401 -1.579 -1.579 -2.302
(0.561)*** (0.755)*** (0.579)*** (0.568)*** (0.751)***
Language 7.224 5.480 7.976 6.140 5.052
(0.626)*** (0.819)*** (0.653)*** (0.629)*** (0.815)***
YiYj 2.463 2.853 2.527 1.550 1.943
(0.146)*** (0.192)*** (0.151)*** (0.178)*** (0.247)***
(YiYj)/(PopiPopj) -0.397 1.284 -0.596 0.591 1.471
(0.270) (0.415)*** (0.282)** (0.306)* (0.426)***
Distance -3.829 -3.788 -3.865 -2.618 -2.705







OECDi 3.118 0.616 2.830 1.403 -0.166
(0.738)*** (1.000) (0.797)*** (0.767)* (1.005)
OECDj 5.788 2.477 6.169 3.100 1.530
(0.727)*** (0.955)*** (0.801)*** (0.752)*** (0.959)
Observations 13434 6298 12476 10962 6066
R2 Overall 0.29 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.34
R2 Between 0.41 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.45
R2 Within 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
¹ ¸ 0.0576 0.0576 0.0576 0.0576 0.0576
Notes: See text. All variables (except dummies) are in logs. Standard errors in parentheses.
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
39Table 11: Box-Cox Random E®ects Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(StockMkt/Y)j;t¡1 15.045 14.427 15.465 13.261 12.210
(1.223)*** (1.575)*** (1.327)*** (1.348)*** (1.565)***
(Credit/Y)j;t¡1 9.033 3.078 9.480 3.993 1.216
(1.703)*** (1.969) (1.736)*** (1.762)** (1.910)
RXR -0.185 -0.056 -0.070 0.276 0.182
(0.322) (0.416) (0.323) (0.346) (0.398)
V(e) -1.515 -2.951 -0.567 -2.104 -2.844
(1.042) (1.424)** (1.086) (1.178)* (1.433)**
Taxi -3.786 -2.587 -7.613 0.258 -0.170
(2.692) (3.735) (3.072)** (2.926) (3.505)
Capital Tax Treaty 4.851 3.285 4.138 3.351 4.084
(2.864)* (3.541) (2.855) (3.092) (3.548)
Customs Union -6.013 -8.662 -5.772 -11.507 -10.581
(4.335) (5.084)* (4.267) (4.763)** (5.316)**
Free Trade Agr. -4.012 -6.363 -4.269 -4.831 -6.573
(3.743) (4.607) (3.726) (4.164) (4.558)
Service Agr. 1.645 1.587 2.375 2.956 2.062
(3.925) (4.724) (3.866) (4.286) (4.869)
Other Trade Agr. 13.895 20.289 10.002 14.563 19.910
(4.442)*** (5.337)*** (4.538)** (4.662)*** (5.817)***
Skill -2.409 -5.039 -2.594 -3.774 -5.127
(2.313) (2.837)* (2.296) (2.382) (2.788)*
Language 22.767 15.462 24.750 19.070 14.293
(2.374)*** (2.983)*** (2.443)*** (2.467)*** (3.020)***
YiYj 9.058 10.121 8.957 4.013 4.658
(0.577)*** (0.807)*** (0.594)*** (0.807)*** (1.054)***
(YiYj)/(PopiPopj) -0.995 4.795 -1.755 3.055 5.006
(1.193) (1.705)*** (1.243) (1.395)** (1.760)***
Distance -17.903 -13.741 -17.823 -10.879 -7.540







OECDi 5.215 -3.403 2.774 -2.080 -6.019
(3.145)* (3.773) (3.325) (3.130) (3.751)
OECDj 25.965 18.368 26.512 17.922 15.012
(3.029)*** (3.796)*** (3.273)*** (3.286)*** (3.953)***
Observations 13434 6298 12476 10962 6066
Log-Likelihood -16932.83 -8961.57 -16368.98 -13404.68 -8636.94
¹ ¸ 0.0576 0.0576 0.0576 0.0576 0.0576
Notes: See text. All variables (except dummies) are in logs. Standard errors in parentheses.
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%




























































41A Electronic Data Sources
² CIA Factbook: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
² Languages: http://www.eiti.com/country language lookup.cfm
² Tax Treaties: http://treaties.tax.org/ (30-day free trial o®er)
² Trade Agreements: http://www.wto.org/english/trato e/region e/region e.htm
² Human Capital: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
B Box-Cox Tobit Model
B.1 Simple Speci¯cation
Let y denote M&A °ows and X be the matrix of regressors described in Section 3.2, then
(1) can be written as:
ln(y) = X
0¯ + "; (B.1)
where time and group notation have been dropped for convenience and " » N(0;¾2). As
discussed in the text, two problems must be dealt with: (i) the log of zero does not exists,
and (ii) y is censored at zero. The following model outlines how this can be dealt with.
B.2 Model








where y¤ is the latent variable. Second, rather than estimating (B.1) the following model is





n¯ + "n; (B.3)









¸ if ¸ 6= 0;
ln(y¤
n) if ¸ = 0:
(B.4)
42Given the censoring problem and that ¸ is unknown, (B.3) must be estimating using
maximum likelihood estimation. Now, following Ruud (2000)22 and using his notation, I
¯nd the following densities given that g(¢) is an increasing, monotonic function and the
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if c > 0:
(B.5)






















where 1 is the indicator function. Ideally, one would like to optimize (B.6) over ¸, ¯ and ¾,
but this is not feasible computationally. Therefore, a simple change of variable is made to
facilitate optimization. Speci¯cally, let z¤
n(¹ ¸) ´ g(y¤
n; ¹ ¸)+ 1
¹ ¸, where ¹ ¸ is a ¯xed ¸, whose value
is chosen \optimally" by a grid search over a range of values of ¸. Given this substitution,




















which is simply the Tobit model (Tobin (1958)). The case of ln(y¤ +1) follows immediately
by setting g(¢) equal to this expression.
The Tobit model can incorporate heteroskedasticity and can be applied to panel data as
well. In particular, a random e®ects model can be extended from above. However, estima-
tion of this model requires simulation given that the likelihood function for each group is
expressed as an integral. Fortunately, Stata 7.0 has a routine to estimate this model using
the Gauss-Hermite quadrature approximation method. This method is susceptible to numer-
ical inaccuracy and depends on the number of quadrature points used in the approximation.
However, the estimations in this study appear to be fairly robust.
22pp. 791{801.
43C ln(1+M&A) Tables
Table 12: ln(1+M&A) Pooled OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(StockMkt/Y)j;t¡1 0.947 0.922 0.980 0.769 0.772
(0.094)*** (0.123)*** (0.123)*** (0.090)*** (0.122)***
(Credit/Y)j;t¡1 0.577 0.584 0.637 0.484 0.581
(0.141)*** (0.196)*** (0.147)*** (0.130)*** (0.189)***
RXR 0.005 0.016 0.017 0.011 0.015
(0.030) (0.040) (0.031) (0.030) (0.040)
V(e) -0.045 -0.051 0.019 0.061 0.038
(0.115) (0.165) (0.128) (0.124) (0.167)
Taxi -0.831 -0.949 -1.172 -0.519 -0.754
(0.267)*** (0.378)** (0.317)*** (0.256)** (0.362)**
Capital Tax Treaty 0.508 0.652 0.499 0.349 0.631
(0.389) (0.496) (0.390) (0.378) (0.491)
Customs Union -1.075 -1.933 -1.070 -1.632 -1.951
(0.548)** (0.658)*** (0.561)* (0.580)*** (0.667)***
Free Trade Agr. -0.476 -1.353 -0.482 -0.332 -1.210
(0.503) (0.612)** (0.511) (0.518) (0.612)**
Service Agr. 2.290 3.036 2.389 2.672 3.041
(0.553)*** (0.706)*** (0.558)*** (0.575)*** (0.700)***
Other Trade Agr. 0.313 0.766 0.068 0.490 0.760
(0.343) (0.495) (0.355) (0.346) (0.506)
Skill -0.323 -0.735 -0.288 -0.429 -0.698
(0.235) (0.328)** (0.241) (0.233)* (0.331)**
Language 2.615 1.831 2.943 2.230 1.749
(0.265)*** (0.336)*** (0.284)*** (0.259)*** (0.334)***
YiYj 1.033 1.131 1.054 0.575 0.781
(0.056)*** (0.075)*** (0.058)*** (0.072)*** (0.105)***
(YiYj)/(PopiPopj) 0.484 0.576 0.389 0.421 0.525
(0.107)*** (0.168)*** (0.119)*** (0.116)*** (0.164)***
Distance -1.537 -1.326 -1.538 -1.024 -0.949







OECDi -0.025 -0.173 -0.066 0.178 -0.245
(0.271) (0.405) (0.289) (0.277) (0.403)
OECDj 0.982 0.601 1.185 0.761 0.435
(0.261)*** (0.362)* (0.305)*** (0.259)*** (0.359)
Observations 13434 6298 12476 10962 6066
R2 0.30 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.34
Notes: See text. All variables (except dummies) are in logs. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
44Table 13: ln(1+M&A) Pooled Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(StockMkt/Y)j;t¡1 6.337 5.587 6.468 5.298 4.677
(0.576)*** (0.711)*** (0.616)*** (0.592)*** (0.705)***
(Credit/Y)j;t¡1 2.687 1.251 3.085 1.133 0.747
(0.911)*** (1.035) (0.966)*** (0.808) (0.913)
RXR -0.051 0.013 -0.022 0.094 0.047
(0.113) (0.136) (0.115) (0.115) (0.133)
V(e) -0.218 -0.393 0.247 0.388 0.067
(0.446) (0.552) (0.469) (0.502) (0.556)
Taxi -2.649 -2.751 -3.619 -0.926 -1.647
(1.039)** (1.313)** (1.145)*** (1.038) (1.265)
Capital Tax Treaty 1.019 1.295 0.918 0.593 1.540
(1.191) (1.384) (1.164) (1.128) (1.334)
Customs Union -4.521 -5.430 -4.335 -6.411 -5.723
(1.801)** (2.124)** (1.778)** (1.964)*** (2.155)***
Free Trade Agr. -4.004 -6.483 -4.012 -3.206 -5.677
(1.890)** (2.026)*** (1.899)** (1.913)* (2.024)***
Service Agr. 3.806 4.213 4.117 4.098 4.103
(1.735)** (2.094)** (1.708)** (1.861)** (2.095)*
Other Trade Agr. 4.479 7.269 3.027 4.535 6.354
(1.722)*** (2.012)*** (1.679)* (1.669)*** (1.920)***
Skill 0.496 -0.995 0.530 -0.489 -1.305
(0.927) (1.153) (0.917) (0.905) (1.138)
Language 8.318 4.372 9.085 6.586 4.216
(0.899)*** (1.080)*** (0.930)*** (0.875)*** (1.075)***
YiYj 4.156 3.842 4.022 1.411 1.759
(0.202)*** (0.260)*** (0.213)*** (0.365)*** (0.451)***
(YiYj)/(PopiPopj) 2.057 2.196 1.549 1.478 1.802
(0.547)*** (0.772)*** (0.610)** (0.612)** (0.705)**
Distance -7.213 -4.727 -7.196 -4.062 -2.698







OECDi -1.490 -1.050 -1.861 -0.673 -1.615
(1.146) (1.485) (1.148) (1.170) (1.427)
OECDj 7.083 6.092 7.728 6.725 5.503
(1.251)*** (1.453)*** (1.415)*** (1.242)*** (1.422)***
Observations 13434 6298 12476 10962 6066
Log-Likelihood -14890.09 -7791.00 -14374.76 -11694.50 -7482.61
Constant LogL -17122.32 -9029.35 -16546.23 -13671.31 -8720.85
pseudo R2 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14
Notes: See text. All variables (except dummies) are in logs. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
45Table 14: ln(1+M&A) Random E®ects OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(StockMkt/Y)j;t¡1 0.686 0.727 0.737 0.509 0.607
(0.074)*** (0.107)*** (0.088)*** (0.081)*** (0.110)***
(Credit/Y)j;t¡1 0.515 0.489 0.545 0.468 0.397
(0.102)*** (0.153)*** (0.106)*** (0.108)*** (0.154)**
RXR -0.018 -0.011 0.000 0.004 0.001
(0.031) (0.039) (0.032) (0.031) (0.039)
V(e) -0.110 -0.261 -0.048 -0.194 -0.258
(0.082) (0.124)** (0.091) (0.093)** (0.128)**
Taxi -0.358 -0.356 -0.803 -0.152 -0.197
(0.217)* (0.319) (0.266)*** (0.234) (0.322)
Capital Tax Treaty 0.789 0.547 0.786 0.525 0.485
(0.283)*** (0.385) (0.292)*** (0.294)* (0.385)
Customs Union -0.527 -0.974 -0.535 -1.013 -1.132
(0.381) (0.493)** (0.392) (0.417)** (0.515)**
Free Trade Agr. -0.022 -0.400 -0.066 0.074 -0.440
(0.348) (0.460) (0.356) (0.375) (0.469)
Service Agr. 0.989 1.144 1.038 1.266 1.234
(0.364)*** (0.484)** (0.375)*** (0.395)*** (0.500)**
Other Trade Agr. 0.276 0.798 0.085 0.555 0.762
(0.374) (0.477)* (0.393) (0.381) (0.484)
Skill -0.553 -0.876 -0.574 -0.576 -0.839
(0.205)*** (0.276)*** (0.211)*** (0.207)*** (0.275)***
Language 2.624 1.993 2.898 2.233 1.838
(0.228)*** (0.299)*** (0.238)*** (0.229)*** (0.298)***
YiYj 0.897 1.040 0.920 0.564 0.708
(0.053)*** (0.070)*** (0.055)*** (0.065)*** (0.090)***
(YiYj)/(PopiPopj) -0.146 0.466 -0.219 0.215 0.535
(0.099) (0.152)*** (0.103)** (0.112)* (0.156)***
Distance -1.400 -1.385 -1.413 -0.957 -0.990







OECDi 1.137 0.228 1.032 0.510 -0.059
(0.269)*** (0.365) (0.291)*** (0.280)* (0.367)
OECDj 2.115 0.911 2.254 1.133 0.564
(0.265)*** (0.349)*** (0.292)*** (0.274)*** (0.351)
Observations 13434 6298 12476 10962 6066
R2 Overall 0.29 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.34
R2 Between 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.44 0.44
R2 Within 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
Notes: See text. All variables (except dummies) are in logs. Standard errors in parentheses.
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
46Table 15: ln(1+M&A) Random E®ects Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(StockMkt/Y)j;t¡1 5.490 5.274 5.638 4.848 4.463
(0.446)*** (0.576)*** (0.483)*** (0.493)*** (0.572)***
(Credit/Y)j;t¡1 3.296 1.126 3.458 1.453 0.434
(0.622)*** (0.719) (0.634)*** (0.643)** (0.697)
RXR -0.066 -0.020 -0.024 0.101 0.069
(0.118) (0.152) (0.118) (0.126) (0.146)
V(e) -0.558 -1.086 -0.215 -0.775 -1.049
(0.380) (0.521)** (0.397) (0.430)* (0.523)**
Taxi -1.378 -0.952 -2.764 0.092 -0.071
(0.982) (1.366) (1.119)** (1.068) (1.280)
Capital Tax Treaty 1.760 1.207 1.511 1.238 1.521
(1.048)* (1.296) (1.045) (1.135) (1.296)
Customs Union -2.208 -3.155 -2.117 -4.199 -3.865
(1.581) (1.858)* (1.556) (1.739)** (1.941)**
Free Trade Agr. -1.497 -2.375 -1.584 -1.810 -2.443
(1.369) (1.689) (1.362) (1.520) (1.668)
Service Agr. 0.595 0.553 0.862 1.072 0.754
(1.432) (1.727) (1.411) (1.566) (1.779)
Other Trade Agr. 5.090 7.444 3.674 5.332 7.288
(1.622)*** (1.951)*** (1.656)** (1.704)*** (2.129)***
Skill -0.869 -1.845 -0.941 -1.375 -1.883
(0.844) (1.036)* (0.838) (0.871) (1.018)*
Language 8.287 5.655 9.010 6.963 5.219
(0.869)*** (1.088)*** (0.894)*** (0.902)*** (1.104)***
YiYj 3.298 3.702 3.260 1.465 1.701
(0.211)*** (0.292)*** (0.217)*** (0.295)*** (0.385)***
(YiYj)/(PopiPopj) -0.363 1.746 -0.641 1.112 1.824
(0.435) (0.624)*** (0.453) (0.510)** (0.644)***
Distance -6.543 -5.019 -6.509 -3.974 -2.758







OECDi 1.893 -1.230 1.019 -0.762 -2.200
(1.148)* (1.379) (1.212) (1.144) (1.371)
OECDj 9.481 6.740 9.672 6.566 5.500
(1.106)*** (1.386)*** (1.193)*** (1.201)*** (1.447)***
Observations 13434 6298 12476 10962 6066
Log-Likelihood -14146.82 -7446.92 -13651.40 -11189.27 -7172.63
Notes: See text. All variables (except dummies) are in logs. Standard errors in parentheses.
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
47